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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court decided Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.' In what has been described as a
victory for the civil rights forces by some, 2 and judicial perpet-
uation of reverse discrimination by others,a the Court affirmed
two of the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC's)
three policies encouraging minority ownership of broadcast
media. Although essentially "non remedial" in nature, the
Court found these two policies-the enhancement for minor-
ity ownership and management in comparative licensing
Associate Professor, New York Law School. A.B. Grinnell College; J.D. Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania; M.A.C. Annenberg School, University of Pennsylvania. Pro-
fessor Hammond was the first Program Manager of the Minority Telecommunications
Development Program (MTDP), U.S. Department of Commerce, where he was respon-
sible for managing the implementation of the Carter administration's efforts to enhance
minority ownership of mass media. Prior to his position at MTDP, he was an attorney
with the Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP), White House during the Carter
administration. At OTP, Professor Hammond assisted in the research and drafting the
Carter administration's petition to the Federal Communications Commission to imple-
ment the minority ownership policies. While at the Media Access Project, a public
interest communications law firm in Washington, D.C., Professor Hammond served
briefly as counsel to the group of lay and clergy citizens which successfully challenged
the renewal of Faith Center's license in Hartford Connecticut. It was Faith Center's
license which Astroline was ultimately awarded under the FCC's distress sale policy.
The distress sale award to Astroline was the matter at issue in Shurberg Broadcasting of
Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom., Metro Broadcast-
ing, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
The author wishes to thank Teressa Morrero and Jessica Wahl for their assistance
in researching the topics for this article. Thanks are due as well to the trustees and
administration of New York Law School for a research grant that supported work on
this article.
1. 110 S. Ct. 2997, reh'g denied, Ill S.Ct. 15 (1990).
2. See O'Conner, High Court Backs Preference Given to Minorities by FCC, Bos-
ton Globe, June 28, 1990, at 1.
3. See The Strange Career of Jim Crow, Washington Times, July 5, 1990, at D2;
Will, Legislating Racial Spoils, Washington Post, July 5, 1990, at A19, col. 1.
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cases4 and the distress sale transfer to a minority enterprise-
to be consistent with the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws. The Court determined the policies are
substantially related to the achievement of government's im-
portant interest in broadcast diversity. 6  Indeed, the affirm-
ance of the congressionally mandated FCC minority
ownership policies turned, in major part, on the majority's ac-
knowledgement of the continuing importance of the American
public's right to a diversity of ideas.7 A third FCC policy, the
tax certificate policy, which allows owners of broadcast sta-
tions or cable systems who sell their properties to minority
owned or controlled entities to defer payment of capital gains
tax on the sale, was not before the Court.
By contrast, the dissent argued that the minority owner-
ship policies violated the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection because the government, through its policies, did
not treat all citizens as "individuals" but as components of a
racial or ethnic class.9 The dissent also argued that the gov-
4. In comparative proceedings for new broadcast licenses, the FCC.considers the
minority ownership of the proposed licensee as one of many factors in determining
which potential licensee would best serve the public interest and is therefore most de-
serving of the license. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3004-05.
5. Under the distress sale policy, a broadcaster whose has been designated for a
revocation hearing or a hearing on potentially disqualifying issues may, at his or her
election and prior to start of such hearings, elect to transfer the license to an entity
which is more than 50% owned by a minority entrepreneur. Id. at 3005.
6. Id. at 3010-11. The Court applied "intermediate scrutiny," rather than "strict
scrutiny," to the FCC's policies. Professor Smolla notes, "The application of a the more
lax intermediate scrutiny test was surprising, because the Court had appeared to be
settling on the strict scrutiny test as the appropriate standard of review for racial affirm-
ative action." Smolla, Affirmative Action in the Marketplace of Ideas, 44 ARK. L. REV.
935, 938 (1991). See infra note 24.
7. Id.
8. Under the tax certificate policy, the FCC issues tax certificates to owners of
broadcast stations or cable systems who elect to sell their properties to minority-owned
or controlled entities or entrepreneurs. If, within a specified period of time, the seller
re-invests the proceeds from the sale of the property in another broadcast company or in
another property deemed to be "similar or related in purpose," the prior sale is treated
as an involuntary conversion, and the gain. derived is not taxable until the replacement
property is sold. The tax certificate component is authorized pursuant to I.R.C. § 1071
(1982). See Wilde, FCC Tax Certificates for Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities:
A Critical Re-examination of Policj', 138 U. PA. L. REV. 979 (1990).
9. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3028-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). It should
be noted that Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion in which the Chief Justice and
Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined. Justice Kennedy wrote an additional dissenting
HeinOnline  -- 44 Ark. L. Rev. 1064 1991
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emnment's interest in enhancing broadcast diversity is not
compelling,"° basing this conclusion-on the presumed impact
of the marketplace on an owner's exercise of editorial control
and the FCC's alleged failure to establish a factual predicate
for the nexus between ownership and programming. 1 The
dissent went on to conclude that the diversity interest, as man-
ifested by the minority ownership policies, is not substantial. 12
This article explores the underpinnings of the Court's de-
bate over the relative merits of the first amendment based di-
versity doctrine and the fourteenth amendment based
affirmative action doctrine within the context of the Metro
Broadcasting decision. While either or both doctrines may be
relied upon to justify the policies at issue in Metro Broadcast-
ing,'3 the doctrines are in fact separate areas of jurisprudence
encompassing separate notions of entitlement for distinct but
related ends.
Under the diversity doctrine, increasing the number of
minority viewpoints by increasing minority ownership of the
media is important to achievement of the critical first amend-
ment goal of diversifying control over the means of communi-
cation. This goal is appropriate because the right to speak
(the right to create, select and edit what may be said) is
vested, in significant part, in the owner. Under an expansive
interpretation of the equal protection doctrine, increasing mi-
nority ownership of the mass media is important to the critical
fourteenth amendment goal of removing the results of histori-
cal societal discrimination. This goal is appropriate because
alternative means are unlikely to alter the under-representa-
tion and because the government's efforts are appropriately
limited in their impact.
opinion, joined by Justice Scalia. This article focuses primarily on Justice O'Connor's
dissent.
10. Id. at 3034.
11. Id. at 3041-42.
12. Id. at 3037.
13. See Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc, v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69
Tex. L. Rev. 125, 150-155 (1990) (arguing that the diversity interest coupled with a
remedial purpose passes constitutional muster); Sedler, The Constitution, Racial Prefer-
ence, and the Supreme Court's Institutional Ambivalence. Reflections on Metro Broad-
casting, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1187, 1215-18 (1990) (arguing that the articulation of
differing standards of review was, in the majority's viewpoint, a function of their recog-
nition of the government's interest in diversity).
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By including previously under-represented groups in the
ownership of electronic media, Metro Broadcasting affirms the
government's interest in affirmatively enhancing the public's
first amendment right to diverse and conflicting ideas and
sources of information in the electronic media. It also affirms
the federal government's ability to use properly circumscribed
race conscious remedies to address current recalcitrant results
of societal discrimination.
Metro Broadcasting is unquestionably the law of the land
at this point in history.' 4 However, because the dissenting
Justices in Metro Broadcasting are perceived by many scholars
of the Court to compose the nucleus of the "new" majority, 5
their views on the relationship between ownership, speech and
the changing electronic mass media marketplace are likely to
have a profound impact on future government efforts to meet
what Professor Emerson would refer to as the government's
affirmative obligation to assure diversity consistent with the
first amendment.' 6 Their views on equal protection have al-
ready severely undermined state and municipal efforts to alle-
viate the pernicious legacy of racial discrimination and
exclusion. '7
14. See Devins, supra note 13, at 129.
15. See Wohl, What's Left, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1991, at 41 ("The resignation of Justice
William J. Brennan last summer reignited the continuing discussion surrounding the
growing conservative majority of the Supreme Court."); McDaniels, Judicial Flash
Points, NEWSWEEK, July 30, 1990, at 18; Thomas, McDaniels, DeFrank and Cohn, The
Bush Court, NEWSWEEK, July 30, 1990, at 14 ("Brennan's departure finally ensures the
long awaited rightward shift. Indeed, no matter whom Bush chooses, the court in the
1990s is likely to render conservative decisions on the highly charged social issues of
racial discrimination, free speech, the rights of criminal defendants and the separation
of church and state."); Greenhouse, The Year the Court Turned Right, N.Y. Times,
July 7, 1989, at Al, col. 2; Savage & Lautner, Court Backs Government Against Citizen:
Rehnquist Gavels an End to Era ofJudicial Activism, L.A. Times, July 7, 1989, § 1, at 1,
ol. 1.
Now, with the retirement of Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall, and his replace-
ment by Clarence Thomas, the Court's perceived shift to the right will be a "fait accom-
pli." See Kennedy, Thurgood's Legacy: Equal Justice For All, EMERGE, Oct. 1991, at
32; Marshall Retires from US. Supreme Court, NEW YORK L.J., June 28, 1991, at 1,
col. 3.
16. See Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REV.
795, 804 (1981).
17. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Stevens, White and Chief Justice Rehnquist, struck down a
Richmond, Virginia set-aside program for minority-owned construction companies.
The majority concluded that the plan violated the equal protection clause of the Four-
1066
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This article concludes that Metro Broadcasting is more
than the Supreme Court's pronouncement of the relationship
between first amendment diversity and fourteenth amendment
equal protection jurisprudence in the limited context of the
FCC's minority broadcast ownership policies. Rather, the
case has immediate and possible long range implications for
regulation of electronic media in terms of the Court's under-
standing of the relationship between ownership, speech, and
the diversity of viewpoints, as well as the scope of the govern-
ment's duty and authority to increase diversity in the current
marketplace. 8 It also has immediate implications for the fu-
ture use of equal protection jurisprudence to remedy the ef-
fects of societal discrimination.' 9
II. THE METRO BROADCASTING OPINION
A. Context
The Metro Broadcasting case was decided in the summer
of 1990 in the midst of what many perceive as a critical junc-
ture in the history of American race relationships. An ex-
tended economic recession has sparked historical, and
cyclical, friction between Americans of predominantly Afri-
can and European decent. 20 Many have asserted that this fric-
teenth Amendment. The decision was the first instance in which the Court invalidated
a government initiated affirmative action program by applying the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review. The Richmond plan was deemed unsupported by evidence of past dis-
crimination and insufficiently tailored to achieve its stated remedial purpose. Id. at 498,
507-10.
18. The market for the electronic distribution and receipt of aural and video infor-
mation is increasingly perceived by the government, industry, scholars and consumers
to include a growing number of new and potential wire, fiber and spectrum based com-
petitors besides broadcast stations. The Metro Broadcasting opinion may provide some
guidance to the legislative and administrative branches of government regarding the
enhancement of ownership diversity in these other "competitive" electronic distribution
technologies.
19. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3028 ("Today the Court squarely rejects the
proposition that a governmental decision that rests on a racial classification is never
permissible except as a remedy for a past wrong.").
20. From the animosity of free-soilers in the pre-Civil War decades to that of the
northern labor unions and white southern craftsmen in the 1860s; from the economic
exploitation of sharecropping and "Jim Crow" laws enforced by the physical intimida-
tion of lynchings to the race riots spawned in part by the northern reactions to the
"Great Migration" between 1915 and 1940; from the civil rights battles of the 1950s and
1960s to the current battles over affirmative action and "quotas," Americans of
predominantly African and European ancestry have historically fought over the distri-
HeinOnline  -- 44 Ark. L. Rev. 1067 1991
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tion has been exacerbated by current efforts of the Bush
administration to capitalize on the division between such
Americans.2 1 Meanwhile, an extended debate over the virtues
and excesses of affirmative action and multicultural diversity
rages between and among conservative, minority and feminist
members of academe and the larger American intellectual
community.22
The "racial" tensions, political machinations and debates
occur at a time of impending demographic and cultural
change. American society is undergoing a population and cul-
tural shift from a more European composition and focus to
one of increasing pluralism composed of Asian, Hispanic, and
African American as well as Native and European American
bution of economic opportunity and benefits. See generally R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUS-
TICE (1977); Boris & Honey, Gender, Race, and the Policies of the Labor Department,
111 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 26 (1988); Whitaker, Starr, McCormick, Smith, Mabry,
Wright, and Carrol, A Crisis of Shattered Dreams, NEWSWEEK, May 6, 1991, at 28;
Mathews, Quotas, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 31, 1990, at 28; Black Americans Still Trailing
Behind, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 3, 1990, at 17; Gone Up North, Gone Out West, Gone;
Exhibition of the Great Migration at the National Museum of American History, 18
SMITHSONIAN, May, 1987, at 72; Arnebeck, Two Centuries of Two Races, Washington
Post Magazine, Oct. 17, 1982, at 24.
21. See generally Fineman, McCormack, Carrol and Smith, The New Politics of
Race, NEWSWEEK, May 6, 1991, at 22; Mathews, supra note 20, at 29; De Witt, U.S.
Eases College Aid Stand, But Not All the Way: Change on Race Based Scholarships
Brings New Criticism, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
22. Henry, Beyond the Melting Pot, TIME, Apr. 9, 1990, at 28 ("At stake at the
college level is whether the traditional 'canon' of Greek, Latin and West European hu-
manities study should be expanded to reflect the cultures of Africa, Asia and other parts
of the world."). See also D'Souza, Illiberal Education; Current Controversies in Ameri-
can Higher Education, 267 ATLANTIC 51 (1991); Menand, Books: Illiberalisms, NEW
YORKER, May 20, 1991, at 101.
The larger society is in the midst of debates over the extent to which minorities and
women may be viewed and treated as victims of racism and sexism as opposed to being
required to take responsibility for their economic and social station in life. See generally
S. STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER (1990); Stanfill, Woman Warrior,
NEW YORK, Mar. 4, 1991, at 22-30; Applebome, Stirring a Debate on Breaking Ra-
cism's Shackles, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1990, at A18, col. 1; Bold, The Pathetic Phalluses
of Art, The Sunday Times, May 13, 1990, Features Section.
Yet another growing controversy concerns the extent and manner in which minor-
ity, female, and gay individuals may be addressed and the issues concerning them may
be discussed. A significant portion of this controversy also takes place on many of the
nation's college campuses. See Morganthau, Mabry, Genao, and Washington, Race on
Campus: Failing the Test?, NEWSWEEK, May 6, 1991,'at 26; Adler, Starr, Chideya,
Wright, Wingert, and Haac, Taking Offense; Is This the New Enlightenment on Campus
or the New McCarthyism?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 24, 1990, at 48; Rieff, The Case Against
Sensitivity, ESQUIRE, Nov. 1990, at 120.
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influences, 23 leavened by changing relationships between the
sexes.
In this context, Metro Broadcasting may provide some in-
sight into the Court's reasoning when faced with intersecting
issues of rice, cultural diversity and government regulation.
The reasoning is especially informative where, as in Metro
Broadcasting, the views of the Court's membership may fairly
be argued to reflect, in part, the conflicting ideologies on mer-
its of cultural diversity, race, and regulation currently evident
in American society.24
There is an added critical nuance, however. While the
FCC's minority ownership policies are arguably the products
of particular ideologies of cultural diversity, race, and govern-
23. See, Henry, supra note 22.
24. The Metro Broadcasting majority retains the traditional liberal view that the
government has a bona fide role in assuring the diversity of cultural as well as political
viewpoints and in remedying the adverse social impact of the history of racial discrimi-
nation on groups as well as individuals. In sanctioning the use of race related remedies,
the majority balances equities and concludes .that the ownership policies' impact on
non-minorities is slight. This viewpoint is espoused by significant portions of the Con-
gress and many civil rights groups.
The dissent insists on a direct causal link between discrimination and the individ-
ual. This insistence, coupled with its refusal to recognize societal discrimination against
groups as actionable, and its concern for "innocent victims" of affirmative action, re-
flects the conservative position currently voiced by the Bush Administration and some
Americans of European ancestry. See supra notes 20-21.
The positions of the Metro Broadcasting Court on equal protection and affirmative
action bespeak an inability on the part of the Justices to engage in meaningful dialogue
and compromise. This hardening of the lines of debate reflects the same polar schism
that infects the national debate and undermines the prospects for honest debate and
equitable resolution.
Nevertheless, as Professor Smolla has explicitly recognized and Professor Sedler
implies, the difference between the intermediate scrutiny standard of the Metro Broad-
casting majority and the strict scrutiny standard of the dissenters is one of degree, not of
kind. See Sedler, supra note 13, at 1232-33; Smolla, supra note 6, at 954-56. Both the
majority and the dissent endorse some amount of affirmative action, the disagreement is
over how much and under what circumstances. Professor Smolla argues that ulti-
mately, the moral distinction between the two modes of review (and the consequent
impact of the remedies), is meaningless. He suggests that even the strict scrutiny for-
mulation allows transfers of benefits to persons who may not have suffered from an
institution's prior discrimination. At the same time, the formulation still allows the cost
of the transfer to be borne by those who may be neither the perpetrators nor benefi-
ciaries of the prior discrimination. Smolla, supra note 6, at 955-56.
Issues of respective morality aside, however, the operative effect of the employment
of the strict scrutiny standard in most cases is likely to be the denial of affirmative action
as a remedy for racially manifested current and socio-historical inequalities. Sedler,
supra note 13, at 1235-36.
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ment, they arose out of and concern the scope of government
regulation of the broadcast electronic mass media, an industry
originally created in Congress' image (i.e. as representative of
the respective local service areas and the nation). The policies
are a direct attempt by the government to enhance the partici-
pation of members of the broadcasters' service area in local
and national debate. Thus, a decision about these FCC poli-
cies is a decision about the extent to which under-represented
groups may acquire government sponsored access to and par-
ticipation in electronic broadcast fora. These fora often set
the parameters of the debate on race, culture and regulation
by determining how such issues are described, debated and
decided.
B. The Opinion
At issue in the Metro Broadcasting case were two of the
FCC's minority ownership policies-the minority enhance-
ment policy and the distress sale policy. In comparative hear-
ings for the initial award of broadcast licenses, the FCC
awards an enhancement for minority ownership and participa-
tion in the day to day management of the proposed licensee.25
The enhancement is then weighed with a host of other factors
in determining which applicant will be awarded the license.26
The FCC's distress sale policy allows a radio or television
broadcaster whose license has been set for hearing on disquali-
fying issues to transfer that license to a minority owned entity
prior to an FCC adjudication of the issues. 27  The FCC
adopted these two policies, along with others,28 to promote
the diversification of broadcast programming. The policies
were adopted after the FCC determined that its prior efforts
to encourage minority participation in the broadcast industry
had not resulted in greater broadcast diversity and that the
lack of greater broadcast diversity was detrimental to both the
25. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3004-05.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 3005.
28. The FCC also established the tax certificate policy and its female ownership
policy. Id. See Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that the FCC
lacked the statutory authority to grant enhancement credits in a comparative hearing
for a new license to applicants having significant female ownership). See also supra note
8 (describing the tax certificate policy).
1070
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minority and majority viewing and listening audiences. 29
The policies under review were challenged in separate
proceedings and consolidated for consideration by the
Supreme Court.3 ° In one case, Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
sought review of a decision by the FCC and the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals affirming the award of a new television li-
cense to Rainbow Broadcasting Co. in a comparative hearing.
In that case, the court of appeals affirmed the FCC's determi-
nation that Rainbow's minority ownership substantially out-
weighed factors favoring Metro Broadcasting.31
In the second case, a different panel of the same circuit
court of appeals invalidated an FCC order approving Faith
Center, Inc.'s distress sale of its television license to Astroline
Communications Co. In that case, the court ruled that the
FCC order allowing the distress sale deprived Shurberg
Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. of its right to equal protection
under the fifth amendment.32 The Supreme Court, in a 5 to 4
decision, affirmed the Metro Broadcasting decision and re-
versed the Shurberg decision.33
The majority held that the minority ownership policies,
although not intended to be remedial, do not violate equal
protection. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, found
the policies, which were specifically approved and mandated
by Congress, serve the important government interest of
broadcast diversity and are substantially related to that inter-
est.34 The finding of a substantial relationship between the
policies and the government's interest in broadcast diversity
was deemed to be supported by the government's conclusion
that there is an empirical nexus between minority ownership
and greater diversity.35 The FCC's conclusion was found to
29. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3004 (citing Statement of Policy on Minority
Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C. 2d 979, 980-81 (1978)).
30. Id. at 3002.
31. Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347, 349 (D.C. Cir.
1989). The FCC approved its Review Board's determination that Rainbow's credit for
90% minority ownership outweighed Metro Broadcasting's credits for local residence,
civic participation and 19.8% minority ownership.
32. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 903 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
33. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3028.
34. Id. at 3010-16.
35. Id. at 3011.
1071
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be consistent with its long held view that ownership is a pri-
mary determinant of program diversity. 6 Further, the major-
ity determined that the ascertained link between' minority
ownership and greater diversity was not a function of imper-
missible stereotyping, but the product of educated expectation
corroborated by empirical evidence.3 7
In contrast, the dissent argued that the minority owner-
ship policies violate the constitutional guarantee of equal pro-
tection because the government does not treat all citizens as
"individuals" but as components of a racial or ethnic class.38
It argued that the government's interest in diversity of broad-
cast viewpoints is not sufficiently compelling to justify use of
racial classifications. Likening the government's interest in di-
versity to concerns of societal discrimination which it had re-
cently discounted in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,39
the dissent argued that the diversity interest is too amor-
phous.' According to Justice O'Connor, the government has
no ability to define or measure a particular "race related"
viewpoint or assess the diversity of broadcast viewpoints.
Consequently, the interest could support arbitrary measures
that could amount to "outright racial balancing. "41
Surprisingly, the dissent also asserted-without provid-
ing support-that Congress's and the FCC's interest in the
diversity of viewpoints in broadcasting is not "weighty
enough," even when not used as a justification for the use of
racial classifications. 42 It came to this conclusion despite ac-
knowledging that the FCC, pursuant to the statutory public
interest mandate, legitimately could be concerned with broad-
cast diversity. It also conceded that the FCC may adopt "lim-
36. Id. at 3010.
37. Id. at 3016.
38. Id. at 3028-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
39. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). In Croson, the members of the Metro Broadcasting dis-
sent were in the majority. In that case the majority ruled that a municipal government's
policy to remedying the effects of societal discrimination violated the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Societal discrimination was deemed too amor-
phous a basis for the imposition of a race based remedy because it might be used to
justify unconstrained racial preferences linked solely to proportional representation of
various races, i.e. quotas. Id. at 505-07. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
40. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3034-35 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 3035 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 507).
42. Id. at 3036.
1072
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ited measures to increase the number of competing licensees
and to encourage licensees to present varied views on issues of
public concern," because of the "peculiarly constrained
broadcast spectrum."43 The dissent maintained, however,
that the FCC's statutory authority to promote constitutional
measures to enhance diversity of viewpoints does not establish
its interest as important for equal protection purposes. Fol-
lowing on the same tack, the dissent (not surprisingly), found
the use of the government's interest'in diversity as justification
for the minority ownership policies to be an "unsettled First
Amendment issue."" According to the dissent, the Court has
never approved policies which serve to "amplify a distinct set
of views or the views of a particular class of speakers."4
The dissent was particularly critical of the evidentiary ba-
sis for the majority's finding of a nexus between minority own-
ership and program content. It questioned the FCC's
assertion of a strong correlation of race and behavior based on
the low percentage of minority owned stations." The dissent
would not allow the FCC to rely on minority under-represen-
tation as a justification for its policies unless it could establish
that minority owned stations provide minority views while
majority owned stations cannot or do not. It further sug-
gested-without elaboration-that the marketplace would
mediate a minority owner's exercise of editorial control such
that there is a reduced assurance that the owners' viewpoint
will emerge unrestrained. 47 Also, the dissent found particu-
larly troubling the inability of the FCC's policies to exclude
members of the favored group who do not possess the desired





46. Id. at 3039-41.
47. Id. The dissent apparently cannot conceive of instances in which the minority
viewpoint, while unrepresented, is still commercially viable. Instances of such occur-
rences, nevertheless, do exist. See, e.g., infra note 98 (discussion between Ted Koppel
and Ray Nunn).
48. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3039 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dis-
sent's formulation of such a high standard of proof in this instance is an attempt to
ignore the extensive evidence actually adduced by the Congress, the FCC. and various
scholars. The insistence on such a stringent standard of proof has been cited as evi-
1073
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Conflicting Doctrines: Diversity v. Equal Protection
As earlier stated, Metro Broadcasting's holding could
have been based on either a diversity or an equal protection
basis---or both. Under either doctrine, the government may
affirmatively act to assure the inclusion of previously under-
represented groups. The underlying purposes and goals of the
doctrines, however, are quite different.
Under the first amendment, diversity is considered an im-
portant goal because it is believed that "truth" and social, as
well as political, consensus will emerge from the clash of di-
verse and often times conflicting ideas and beliefs. 9 In the
specific context of electronic mass media, diversity is en-
hanced by governmental efforts to affirmatively expand the
public's access to the media to increase the variety of ideas
and beliefs disseminated so that the public may be better in-
formed. 0 Enhanced access may be accomplished by diversify-
ing the ownership of the media and/or by requiring that those
who own the media provide diverse programming responsive
to the public. 1 In Metro Broadcasting, the Court addressed
and ultimately upheld the government's efforts to increase di-
versity-the presentation of minority viewpoints-by diversi-
dence of the bias and unrestrained activism members of the dissent are said to possess.
See Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: Judicial
Conservatism of Conservative Justices, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 790 (1991).
It is true that minority oriented programming may be provided by non-minority
entrepreneurs, just as it has been in the past. Indeed, dating back to the 1950s, most
minority oriented radio stations have been majority-owned. Minorities have criticized
these stations for their lack of responsive programming for more than three decades.
See Hammond, Now You See It, Now You Don't: Minority Ownership In An "Unregu-
lated" Video Marketplace, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 633, 648 (1983).
The dissent also criticized the policies as unduly burdensome on non-minority indi-
viduals. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3043 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In doing so,
the dissent failed to acknowledge that to a very significant extent, non-minorities and
minorities form joint ventures to acquire broadcast and cable properties under the
FCC's minority ownership policies. Indeed, given the chronic lack of funding exper-
ienced by minorities, joint venturing with non-minorities possessing capital is often a
must.
49. See Emerson, supra note 16.
50. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
51. Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commission En Banc Programming In-
quiry, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291 (1960).
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fying media ownership through the use of its minority
ownership policies.
Under an expansive interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment, public and/or private efforts to prevent individu-
als or groups of individuals from participating in the social,
political and economic activity of the nation because of immu-
table characteristics such as race are prohibited. The govern-
ment may affirmatively address and remedy both current
societal inequities resulting from prior historical discrimina-
tion against groups and specific identifiable acts of discrimina-
tion against individuals. 2
In Metro Broadcasting, it can be argued that the Court
addressed and ultimately upheld the government's efforts to
"remedy" a current (and prior) societal inequity-the extreme
under-representation of minorities in the ownership of mass
media-through the use of the minority ownership policies
which furthered the important government interest in diver-
sity of viewpoints. 3 In contrast, the dissent, espousing a far
more restrictive interpretation of equal protection, argued that
because the policies were not established to remedy specific
identifiable acts of prior discrimination and because the diver-
sity interest is, in its opinion, non-remedial and ill-defined, it is
not compelling.
B. Conflict of Ideologies
The sharp division between the majority and the dissent
in Metro Broadcasting centered on their respective evaluations
of the government's interest in diversity of viewpoints and
conceptualizations of the requirements of equal protection of
the laws. It may be argued that the hardening lines of debate
on equal protection colored the dissent's exchange concerning
the government's asserted interest in diversity of viewpoints.
Nevertheless, inherent in the dissent's dismissal of the interest
as "too amorphous [and] too insubstantial"54 is a value laden
assessment which should be carefully explored.
52. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
53. Devins, supra note 13, at 150-55.
54. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3034 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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1. Equal Protection
The division between the majority and dissenting posi-
tions in Metro Broadcasting mirror the conflict in the broader
social debate regarding affirmative action. The division on the
Court regarding affirmative action has been variously catego-
rized as a conflict between notions of formal equality versus
real equality, 5" theories of racial neutrality and racial prefer-
ence, 56 and philosophies of liberal individualism versus group-
oriented collectivism. 7 Inherent in these categorizations is
the recognition that the members of the Metro Broadcasting
Court strongly disagree on notions of equal rights and reme-
dies in the context of affirmative action.
The majority embraces the belief that the government,
under appropriately limited circumstances, may use race spe-
cific remedies to combat extremely recalcitrant societal dis-
crimination. The dissent espouses the belief that there are no
appropriate circumstances in which government may use race
specific remedies to address current societal discrimination no
matter how egregious or debilitating." For the members of
55. Jones, Unrightable Wrongs: The Rehnquist Court, Civil Rights, and an Elegy
for Dreams, 25 U.S.F.L. REV. 1, 12 (1990) ("IThere is a dividing line that separates
formal equality and real equality.. .it is the same line which separates fault modeled
notions of intentional wrongdoing from broad social patterns of racial exclusion.").
56. See Sedler, supra note 13.
The "unresolvable dilemma" that American society faces today is that on the
one hand, without positive intervention, such as racial preference, the present
consequences of the social history of racism will not be overcome in the re-
motely foreseeable future, if ever. On the other hand, intervention by means
of racial preference is inconsistent with the ideal of racial neutrality and un-
fairly imposes costs on innocent individual whites.
Id. at 1190.
57. Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 107, 108-09 (1990) ("[T]he liberal [individualistic] conception (of equal protec-
tion] insists on the primacy of individuals, not groups, in our constitutional scheme and
views the individual as the object of fundamental rights .... [I]t resists a basic separa-
tion of the polity into racial groupings from which the individual cannot escape.").
58. As one author has expressed:
From the interpretive vantage point of the [dissent], formal equality marks the
boundary of its normative world. Under the Court's regime of formal equal-
ity, there is no constitutional problem if blacks in overwhelming disproportion
do not participate in the market. This is true even if their disproportionate
absence, is in a general historical sense, traceable to social discrimination. It
becomes in the distorting half light of the Court's common law baselines, a
speculative wrong: How do we know intentional discrimination is the cause of
the exclusion?
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the dissent, race specific remedies may only be employed in
circumstances in which there is a specific identifiable instance
of individualized prior discrimination. The approach to equal
protection taken by the dissent has been criticized as employ-
ing unjustified notions of "white innocence and black abstrac-
tion,"59 as well as intentionally limited contractarian notions
of entitlement.Y'
In Metro Broadcasting, this division of opinion on affirm-
ative action meant that the majority could assess the govern-
ment's minority ownership policies in the context of the
historic and current evidence of minority under-representa-
tion in broadcast ownership and misrepresentation in pro-
gramming provided by the majority owned broadcast media.6'
The majority could also acknowledge the FCC's finding that
there is an increase in positive minority portrayals and respon-
sive programming facilitated by increased minority owner-
ship.62 Based on the evidence and given the policies'
relationship to more than a half century of judicially approved
congressional and administrative policy and statutory law val-
Jones, supra note 55, at 39-40.
It is appropriate to ask what motivates such a fierce and unremitting adherence to
formal equality in the face of overwhehning evidence of inequality. Ellis Cose, in a
recent essay in Time Magazine, may provide some illumination when he states:
White complacency about discrimination is not derived from mere opposition
to preference programs. It is an example of how stereotypes, as they interact
with a belief in meritocracy, add up to a firm conviction that members of
racial minorities deserve no better than they get.
Many Hispanics and blacks do poorly on certain tests, and this provides
plausibly objective support for such ideas. Yet even before ability tests ex-
isted, society assumed that whites were an intellectually and morally superior
race. Such a presumption is, in effect, a white American's birthright. Minori-
ties face a society convinced that they are less fit, unless proved otherwise.
Cose, Are Quotas Really The Problem?, TIME, June 24, 1991, at 70.
59. Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and Black Abstrac-
tion, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 7 (1990). Ross continues
[The rhetorical themes of the nineteenth-century cases on race are still the
essential themes of our contemporary legal rhetoric of race. In the contempo-
rary legal rhetoric created by those Justices who seek to limit efforts to undo
the contemporary reality of racial segregation and economic subjugation, we
see the insistence on white innocence and the abstract depiction of the black
person.
Id.
60. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times,
104 HARV. L. REv. 525, 527-28 (1990).
61. See Metro Broadcasting, I10 S.Ct. at 3021.
62. Id. at 3017 n.31.
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uing diversity, it is understandable that the majority could
conclude that the government's interest in diversity is impor-
tant and the remedy appropriate.
Because the dissent views the use of racial preferences to
advance any asserted government interest in remedying socie-
tal discrimination as impermissible, it could not conclude
other than that the government's interest in diversity is "too
amorphous, too insubstantial and too unrelated to any legiti-
mate basis for employing racial classifications. '6 3 Nor could it
conclude other than that enhanced representation for minori-
ties in the electronic media via the ownership policies is im-
permissible. In the process, the dissent apparently ignored
recent Court precedent in Regents of the University of Califor-
nia v. Bakke" and mischaracterized the evidence upon which
the FCC and Congress relied in developing the policies.
There is an inherent problem with the dissent's reason-
ing. Where discrimination has been the pattern and practice
of business, it is not confined to isolated instances. Instead, it
disadvantages all individuals within the group or class. Under
Justice O'Connor's reasoning, the government would be re-
quired to refrain from using the ownership remedy unless spe-
cific victims of discrimination are involved.65 Absent a
63. Id. at 3034 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor continued:
Under the appropriate standard, strict scrutiny, only a compelling interest
may support the Government's use of racial classifications ....
An interest capable of justifying race-conscious measures must be suffi-
ciently specific and verifiable, such that it supports only limited and carefully
defined uses of racial classifications. In Croson, we held that an interest in
remedying societal discrimination cannot be considered compelling.
Id. See also Sedler, supra note 13, at 1229 ("Justice O'Connor's application of 'strict
scrutiny' to the use of racial preferences to advance the asserted interests cannot be
separated from her view as to the impermissibility of the asserted interest in the first
place.").
64. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). As one author has stated:
If the interest in achieving "racial diversity" in a university student body was
"compelling" because it contributed to the presentation of diverse viewpoints
within the student body, then it is difficult to see why the FCC's interest in
achieving "racial diversity" in broadcasting for the benefit of the viewing and
listening public would not be equally compelling.
Sedler, supra note 13, at 1217. For a further discussion of Bakke's relevance, see id. at
1194-97, 1216-19.
65. See Dixon, The Dismantling of Affirmative Action Programs: Evaluating City
of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 7 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. 35, 47 (1991) (identify-
ing the same difficulty with O'Connor's position in Croson).
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showing of discriminatory intent by some identifiable actor,
racial exclusion, no matter how chronic, is not actionable. 66
As a result, the uncontrovertible fact that an entire group of
individuals has been victimized is ignored.
2. Diversity
In exploring the Metro Broadcasting dissent's views on
the diversity rationale, it is necessary to discuss the "weighti-
ness" of the government's interest in diversity, the nexus be-
tween ownership, speech, and diversity in general, and
specifically, the nexus between minority ownership and
diversity.
a. What Does the Government's Interest
in Diversity Weigh?
Justice O'Connor argued that the government's interest
in diversity of viewpoints in broadcasting is not "weighty
enough" even when not used as a justification for the use of
racial classifications. She offered little to explain this assertion
other than to state that the interest is "amorphous" because
the government allegedly has "no way of assessing the diver-
sity of viewpoints. ' 67 Her reading of prior precedent would
not support a finding that the FCC has the statutory author-
ity, consistent with the first amendment, to justify the inclu-
sion of minority viewpoints via increased ownership of the
broadcast medium.
Justice O'Connor's assertions notwithstanding, the gov-
ernment has, on occasion, ascertained that a diversity of view-
points has not, in fact, been presented. Prior to the repeal of
the fairness doctrine,68 the FCC determined that a number of
66. Hart, supra note 59, at 35.
67. Id. at 45.
68. The fairness doctrine required that broadcast licensees affirmatively cover con-
troversial issues of public importance in their respective areas of license. And, when
information on such issues was to be broadcast as part of a licensee's public interest
obligations, the licensee was required to provide a reasonable opportunity for the pres-
entation of opposing or contrasting viewpoints on the controversial issues covered. The
underlying justification for the fairness doctrine was the scarcity of available broadcast
outlets in relation to all who sought to broadcast. In this context, it was believed that
government efforts to assure a more balanced presentation of competing views tended to
enhance the flow of diverse viewpoints to the public.
In 1985, the FCC concluded that the public's interest in diverse viewpoints was
1079
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broadcasters had failed to present contrasting views on issues
of public controversy. 69 Further, some of the more egregious
instances in which the FCC was requested and/or ultimately
required to deny the renewal of licenses concerned the chronic
and repeated refusal of some broadcast licensees to present di-
verse minority oriented programming.7 ° In these cases, the
FCC ultimately decided to "amplify a distinct set of views
which in fact constituted the views of a distinct class of speak-
ers." 71 Thus the FCC, albeit reluctantly in some cases, has
ascertained what constitutes a viewpoint and assessed whether
or not a diversity of viewpoints exists.
better served by the increasing number of broadcast and new technology outlets in the
marketplace. It further found that government efforts to enhance diversity through the
enforcement of the doctrine restricted the editorial freedom of broadcasters and inhib-
ited the presentation of controversial issues of public importance. See Inquiry Into Sec-
tion 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning General Fairness
Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees (1985 Fairness Doctrine Report), 102
F.C.C.2d 143 (1985). After a subsequent judicial determination that Congress had not
codified the fairness doctrine into statutory law, the FCC repealed the fairness doctrine
in 1987. Its decision was affirmed two years later. See Telecommunications Research
and Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, reh'g denied, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919, (1987) (holding that Congress had not codified the fairness
doctrine into law). See also, Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, recon. denied, 3
F.C.C.R. 2035, aff'd, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 717 (1990).
(affirming the FCC's determination that the fairness doctrine was contrary to the public
interest and the first amendment.)
Opponents of the FCC's minority ownership policies cited the FCC's decision to
repeal the fairness doctrine as grounds for repealing the ownership policies as well.
They argued that the FCC's determination that the increasing number of broadcast and
other electronic distribution outlets were sufficient to address the public's need for in-
creased diversity precluded the need for the minority ownership policies. See Shurberg
Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 920-21, (D.C. Cir. 1989). As the
Metro Broadcasting majority noted, however, the FCC concluded that the increasing
number of outlets had not served as a basis for questioning the continuing efficacy of its
minority ownership policies. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at'3022 n.41, (citing Syra-
cuse Peace Council, 3 F.C.C.R. 2035, 2041 n.56 (1988)).
69. See Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Public Media Center
v. FCC, 587 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. 24
F.C.C.2d 18 (1970), recon. denied, 27 F.C.C. 2d 565 (1971); In re Alan F. Neckritz, 29
F.C.C.2d 807 (1971), aff'd, 37 F.C.C.2d 528 (1972), sustained, 502 F. 2d 411 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Wilderness Society, 30 F.C.C.2d 643 (1971). See also Fairness Report of 1974, 48
F.C.C.2d 1 (1974), recon. denied, 58 F.C.C.2d 691 (1976), aff'd, NCCB v. FCC, 567 F.
2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978).
70. See Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 50 F.C.C.2d 461 (1975); Leflore
Broadcasting Co., 46 F.C.C.2d 980 (1974); Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C.
1143 (1965), rev'd sub nom. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
71. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3036 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that
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The assertion that the diversity interest enjoys little
weight is puzzling. The interest, which is admittedly societal
in nature, is to assure the widest possible dissemination of in-
formation from diverse and antagonistic sources because it is
essential to the welfare of the public and the democracy. The
constitutional purpose is to foster the public's right to speech
by assuring access to the means of expression as widely as is
possible. 72 The critical importance of the interest and its un-
derlying purpose to the political, social and cultural process of
the nation has long been recognized by Congress, the Court
and numerous scholars.73
At the inception of broadcasting, Congress recognized
that a decision to vest an absolute speech right in the owner of
the technology (broadcasting) would result in denying the
right of electronic speech to the substantial majority of the
American public. Recognizing that the broadcast licensee
would have control of a powerful technology relying on a
scarce public resource, Congress opted to vest only a portion
of the speech right in the broadcaster, reserving to the public
the larger interest and speech right via access and diversity.74
the Court has never upheld a broadcast measure to amplify a distinct set of views, or the
views of a particular class of speakers).
The FCC's action in the United Church of Christ and Alabama Educational Televi-
sion cases, see supra note 69 and accompanying text, point out the fallacy in Justice
O'Connor's assertion. While the views of the black citizens of Mississippi and Alabama
were not totally unique to blacks, the views were the outgrowth of their experience of
racial prejudice as a distinct cultural, economic, and political community. Moreover,
their assertion of a right to a fair and balanced portrayal of the issues surrounding
segregation versus integration was an assertion made by a group of black citizens and
their respective communities (a class of potential and previously disenfranchised speak-
ers). Given the Justice's concession that the FCC enjoys sufficient authority to regulate
licensee programming, it is unlikely that she would find such action constitutionally
suspect.
72. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct at 3010-11.
73. See J. ABRAMSON, F. ARTERTON & G. ORREN, THE ELECTRONIC COMMON-
WEALTH 239-42 (1988); T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1966). See also Carter, Technology, Democracy and the Manipulation of
Consent, 93 YALE L. J. 581 (1984); Emerson, supra note 19; Fiss, Why The State? 100
HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987).
74. The Supreme Court has recognized that part of the reason for the enactment of
the Communications Act of 1934 was that "Congress moved under the widespread fear
that in the absence of governmental control the public interest might be subordinated to
monopolist domination in the broadcast field." FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309
U.S. 134, 137 (1940).
The balancing of broadcaster and public interests in speech predates the enactment
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The Metro Broadcasting majority recognized the essential in-
tent of Congress as interpreted by the Court in prior
precedent:
'[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech
by radio [and other forms of broadcast] and their collec-
tive right to have the medium function consistently with
the ends and purposes of the First Amendment,' and [i]t
is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters which is paramount.' . . . 'Congress may
...seek to assure that the public receives through this
medium a balanced presentation of information on issues
of public importance that otherwise might not be ad-
dressed if control of the medium were left entirely in the
hands of those who own and operate broadcasting
stations.' 75
Taking into account the relationship between the govern-
ment's interest in diversity and the constitutional purpose of
enhancing speech, as well as the long-standing precedent ac-
knowledging the relationship, the majority concluded "that
the interest in enhancing broadcast diversity is, at the very
least, an important governmental objective .... ,76
b. The Nexus Between Ownership, Speech,
and Diversity
From the inception of regulation, the government has
recognized a nexus between broadcast ownership and a licen-
see's right to speak. While Congress in 1927 and 1934 appor-
tioned the speech right between its nascent broadcast licensees
and the public, it specifically declined to divorce the speech
right from ownership of the license altogether. On several oc-
of the Communications Act of 1934. As early as 1925, Herbert Hoover, then Secretary
of the Commerce, stated "The ether is a public medium, and its use must be for public
benefit. The use of radio channel is justified only if there is public benefit. The domi-
nant element for consideration in the radio field is, and always will be, the great body of
the listening public." Fourth Radio Conference, at 6. During hearings on the adoption
of the Radio Act of 1927, the predecessor to the 34 Act, Representative Johnson stated:
"American thought and American politics will be largely at the mercy of those who
operate these stations. For publicity is the most powerful weapon that can be wielded in
a republic ...." 67 Cong. Rec. 5557 (1926).
75. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3010 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) and FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468
U.S. 364, 377 (1984)) (citations omitted).
76. Id.
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casions, Congress addressed legislative proposals to extend
common carrier obligations to broadcasters. Had these obli-
gations been imposed, broadcasters, like telephone companies,
would have no right to control the content of speech over
their facilities. Instead, Congress has consistently refused to
impose common carrier regulation on broadcasters and has
elected, as a statutory matter, to recognize the nexus between
ownership and speech.77 The nexus is deemed to exist because
"ownership carries with it the power to select, to edit, and to
choose the methods, manner and emphasis of presentation
.... 78 Ownership has "proved to be significantly influential
with respect to editorial comment and the presentation of
news."
79
Some may argue, however, that recognizing a broadcast
licensee has a right of electronic speech and may exercise edi-
torial control is not the same as finding a close nexus between
the identity and characteristics of the broadcaster and the
viewpoints expressed and programming selected. This is the
gist of the dissent's "stereotyping" argument.80 There are,
however, instances in which evidence of such a nexus have
been found."'
Similarly, Congress and its administrative agencies have
recognized the relationship between ownership, speech and di-
versity. Because of the scarcity of available broadcast spec-
trum and the consequent limited number of stations
transmitting to the public, many representatives of diverse
viewpoints and disciplines were unable to secure stations. As
77. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 105
(1973). Title I of the Communications Act of 1934 specifically exempts broadcasters
from the obligations imposed on common carriers. See Wollenberg, Title III the FCC
as Arbiter of "The Public Interest, Convenience, and Necessity" 61, 73 in A LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS AcT OF 1934 (Paglin ed. 1989).
78. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3012 n. 16 (quoting the Amendment of sec-
tions 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the FCC's rules on Multiple Ownership of Standard,
FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046,
1050 (1975)
79. TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F. 2d 929, 938 (1978).
80. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct at 3037-38 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also
id. at 3045-47 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
81. See Office of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
1966); In re Fairness Doctrine Requirements, 40 F.C.C. 641 (1965); Lamar Life Broad-
casting Co., 38 F.C.C. 1143 (1965); Capitol Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C. 1135 (1965).
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a result, Congress required the licensee of each broadcast sta-
tion to be responsive to diverse community interests.8 2 De-
spite this requirement, the FCC concluded that minority
interests and viewpoints were inadequately represented in the
broadcast media. 3
c. The Nexus Between Minority Ownership
and Diversity
In May of 1978, the FCC concluded that the views of
minorities remained inadequately represented and that the in-
adequacy adversely affected the public's right to diversity.84
According to some, the conclusion is still applicable today."
Whether one examines recent commentary on media stories
involving race,8 6 portrayals of minorities in prime time televi-
82. See Wollenberg, supra note 76, at 66-67 (citing Great Lakes Broadcasting Co.,
3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32 (1929), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
83. Minorities as citizen/consumers have historically exercised little economic or
regulatory control over broadcasting. They traditionally have not been the preferred
customers nor are their preferences accurately determined by advertisers and rating
services. Because they own so few electronic media, they are unable to exercise direct
editorial control over much of what is said about them. And, they have historically
received limited regulatory assistance in enforcing the provision of responsive program-
uing. See Hammond, supra note 48, at 639-45. See also Wimmer, Deregulation and
Market Failure in Minority Programming: The Socioeconomic Dimensions of Broadcast
Reform, 8 CoMM./ENT. 329, 334-88 (1986).
84. Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68
F.C.C.2d 979, 980-81 (1978) ("[W]e are compelled to observe that the views of racial
minorities continue to be inadequately represented in the broadcast media. This situa-
tion is detrimental not only to the minority audience but to all of the viewing and listen-
ing public.")
85. Reynolds, Blacks in TV, Film, Media Complain of Being Thwarted, Gannett
News Service, August 2, 1990 ("Entertainers and newspeople at the National Associa-
tion of Black Journalists conference here voiced a common lament: The image of minor-
ities is being distorted mediawide-from the silver screen to TV to the newsrooms.").
86. Commentators have addressed the difference in perspectives which attend the
reporting of stories by the black-owned and majority-owned press where race is an inte-
gral part of the story. Too often, perspectives of the black individuals and/or commu-
nity are ignored, misrepresented or under-reported. See Dates, Print News, in Split
Image: African Americans in the Mass Media (Dates and Barlow eds. 1990). It has been
argued persuasively that the majority-owned media exacerbated the racial animosity
created by the Stuart murder/Hoax in Boston: "If [Charles] Stuart's lie was the spark,
the media's sensationalism provided fuel and bellows for the burning suspicion and pub-
lic furor." Edley, Racist Media, Politicians Sustained Boston Hoax, MANHATTAN
LAW., March 1990, at 18.
In Page, News, Crime and Double Standards, Chicago Tribune, May 14, 1989, at 3,
Page commented on the coverage (and lack of coverage) assigned to other rapes,
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sion, 87 or recent television programs and movies about the
civil rights struggle,"8 the majority-owned media and press are
the object of continued and often withering criticism regard-
ing their failure to portray blacks and other minorities fairly.
Criticism of the majority media's portrayal of minorities
is not new. It predates the FCC's conclusions by many de-
cades.89 Moreover, it is arguably merely the continuation of
an historical tendency of majority-owned popular and mass
media, literature and the arts to stereotypically portray blacks
murders and assaults of women occurring on the same night or a few weeks before the
Central Park "Wilding Incident." He argued that part of the reason the Central Park
story was covered nationally while others of a similar nature were not is because of the
differences between the victims and their respective assailants. "[Tihe Central Park
victim was white and upwardly mobile and the others were not ... and,... the Central
Park victim was not of the same race as her attackers." Id.
Among the "seven murders and eight shootings [which] occurred the same...
night as the Central Park "Wilding" episode ... was a woman shot in the back of her
head,'bashed with a cinder block, sexually abused with a 5-inch-long pipe, and found
under an elevated highway .... Another was a woman beaten to death in her home
with a telephone and a plaster statue of the Virgin Mary." Id. A few weeks before the
"Wilding" incident, "a 29-year-old woman was raped by two men at gunpoint when she
went to the top of a 21 story building to watch a sunrise... after the men forced her to
jump from the roof, she grabbed a television cable that-miraculously--broke her fall
... [and]... held on, naked and screaming, until residents of the building saved her
life." Id. The last story made the inside of New York city's newspapers.
87. Gates, TV's World Turns-But Stays Unreal, N.Y. Times, § 2, at 1, 40
("There is little connection between the lives of black Americans and the images of
blacks that Americans view daily.").
88. Professor Julian bond has noted:
Today the popular culture has discovered the civil rights movement .... The
lessons we are taught-in superficial film and television treatments of the he-
roic Southern struggle for human rights-is that a war was fought against
racism by noble white Americans and the good guys finally won.
... Nearly thirty movies and television shows, both projected and com-
pleted, focus on the southern movement; their heroes and heroines are Klan
wives, FBI agents, northern summer student volunteers, white southern col-
lege coeds, everyone except the black women and men who lived and died for
freedom's cause.
These shallow treatments of America's finest hour are a reflection, not of
the movement but of our world, a world where white men control the process
of production and ensure their product perpetuates the supremacy of white
America.
Bond, Where We've Been, Where We're Going: A Vision of Racial Justice in the 1990s,
25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 273, 279 (1990).
89. See Hammond, supra note 48; Wimmer supra note 82.
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and other minorities. 90 Whether it be race riots in early 20th
century America, 91 recent racially motivated suspicions and
fears among neighbors in American cities,92 or racially strati-
90. For discussions of racial stereotyping by the press, see Edley, supra note 85;
Page, supra note 85; Reynolds, supra note 84.
Regarding stereotyping in television, see Gates, supra note 86; Hammond, supra
note 48; Horowitz, Snookumsl Steve Urkel is a Hit, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1991, at C 11,
col. 1; Wimmer, supra note 82.
Regarding film and movies, see D. BOGLE, TOM, COONS, MULATTOES, MAMMIES,
AND BUCKS, AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF BLACKS IN AMERICAN FILMS (1989);
Snow, Morning Report: Movies, L.A. Times, Feb. 25, 1991, at F2, col. 1; Samuels, This
Time It Isn't About Jokes, L.A. Times, Sep. 9, 1990, (Calendar) at 19; Wilson, Trying to
Crash the Party, L.A. Times, Mar. 4, 1990, (Calendar) at 3; Spike Lee Says He Does Not
Have All the Answers, UPI Regional News, Mar. 1, 1990; 'Do the Right Thing': Issues
and Images, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1989, § 2, at 1, col. 2 (Arts and Leisure Desk); Kem-
pley, Spike Lee, Mastering the Havoc, Washington Post, Oct. 22, 1986, at CI (Style
Section); Sawyers, Passions Erupt Over 'Birth of A Nation,' Chicago Tribune, Oct. 11,
1987, (Sunday Magazine) at 9; Siskel, Pioneering 'Lying Lips' Launches Weekend of
Black Films, Chicago Tribune, May 17, 1985, at A2 (Sports Final Ed., Zone N).
Regarding the stereotypic portrayal of blacks in art, see Wilson, Robert Colescott
Sharpens his Edge, L.A. Times, Jan. 1, 1991, at F8, col. 1; Iverem, A Controversial
Exhibit Opens, NEWSDAY, Apr. 17, 1990, § II, at 11; Wilson, 'Facing History: Insights
Into Racism, L.A. Times, Feb. 18, 1990, (Calendar) at 6; Kimmelman, Black Images of
the Past: Servile, Subhuman, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1990, at C21, col. 3; Vromen, Show
Traces History of White Stereotypes of Blacks, REUTERS LIBRARY REPORT, Jan. 7,
1990; Welzenbach, Images on the Other Side, Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1989, at C6
(Style Magazine); Richard, Robert Colescott's Perspectives on Black and White, Wash-
ington Post, Jan. 20, 1988, at CI (Style Magazine).
With regard to the portrayals of blacks in theatre, see Breslauer, Gotta Sing? Gotta
Dance?, L.A. Times, Nov. 11, 1990, (Calendar) at 5; Williams, Stage; Two Trips
Through the 'Colored Museum, More Apologies for Racism, L.A. Times, Jun. 12, 1988,
(Calendar) at 47; Freedman, After 50 Years, 'Porgy' Comes to the Met as a Certified
Classic, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1985, § 2, at 1, col. 6.
91. See Fairlie, What Is This About America Being Politically Violent?, Washing-
ton Post, April 5, 1981, at Cl (Outlook Section, Fairlie at Large). See also Sawyers,
supra note 89; Gone Up North, Gone Out West, Gone, supra note 20; Arnebeck supra
note 20.
92. Racially motivated fears and misunderstandings can have extremely dangerous
consequences. For instance,
[O]ne woman's bizarre behavior, combined with rumor and speculation, fu-
eled latent racial fears and sparked a potentially volatile situation [in a quiet
middle class Islip Terrace community]. By the time Magrone, (who is white],
was arrested [for writing and surreptitiously distributing anti-white letters],
terror had spread throughout the all-white [block]. Several families bought
dogs for protection. Residents took to carrying sticks, and children, scared to
sleep alone, were crawling into their parents' beds at night .... Residents
speculated the letters were being dispatched by members of a black family that
had [recently moved from the block].
Before long, people were "sighting" intruders in their yards and calling
police to report on what turned out to be shadows falling across their
bushes.... [P]olice officers said the atmosphere on the street was so tense that
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fled ignorance among whites,93 portions of the majority-owned
mass media are fairly perceived as contributing to negative ra-
cial tensions and continued ignorance. There is a current, as
well as an historical, nexus between majority culture, majority
ownership, and negative or incomplete portrayals of minori-
ties. There is, therefore, a nexus between majority-owned me-
dia and a discernable, palpable lack of diversity regarding the
portrayal of minority viewpoints and interests.94
By contrast, the Congress, the FCC and the Metro
Broadcasting Court found that a minority owner's status tends
to influence the selection of news coverage and editorial view-
point and the presentation of minority images in local news
programming.95 Despite this evidence and the concomitant
historical lack of diversity provided by major portions of the
majority-owned media, Justice O'Connor finds no ascertain-
able nexus between minority ownership and diversity. In her
mind, the government's reliance on such evidence is merely
reliance on stereotypes, aggregate tendencies, and probabilities
which inevitably do not apply to certain individuals. 96
There is literal truth to the observation that one cannot
expect all minorities to "think alike." For instance, the simple
it could have sparked a Bensonhurst-scale incident.. .'After one of the sight-
ings of the prowler, there were twenty neighbors out there with baseball bats,'
said a neighbor. ... 'I don't see how a black person could have walked down
that street without having their head taken off.'
Rabin, Hoax Fed on Prejudice; Frightened by Notes, Neighbors Suspected Black Family,
NEWSDAY, Oct. 10, 1990, at 3 (News). See also Edley, supra note 85.
93. See Duke, White's Racial Stereotypes Persist; Most Retain Negative Beliefs
About Minorities, Survey Finds, Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1991, at Al ("A majority of
whites questioned in a nationwide survey [conducted by the National Opinion Research
Center at the University of Chicago] said they believe blacks and Hispanics are likely to
prefer welfare to hard work and tend to be lazier than whites, more prone to violence,
less intelligent and less patriotic."). See also May, The Racial Gap, L.A. Times, Jan. 9,
1989, Pt. 1, at 1, col. 1; Williams, Closed Doors: Benign Racism in America, NEW RE-
PUBLIC, Nov. 10, 1986.
94. Williams, supra note 60, at 535.
95. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3016-19 & nn.31-35 (citing various studies
supporting the finding of a nexus between minority ownership and diversity).
96. Id. at 3038-43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Professor Smolla suggests that some
critics of the FCC minority ownership policies might require that the policies address
the ownership/diversity nexus issue by requiring the would-be minority licensees (the
beneficiaries of the policies) to demonstrate some kind of "minority orientation" in pro-
gramming. See Smolla, supra note 6, at 960-64. This requirement, which is consistent
with a proposal rejected in TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974) has some merit, especially in light of the Court's disagree-
1087
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fact of being born "black," or Hispanic, or Asian, or Native
American does not bring with it a corresponding genetic pref-
erence for things associated with that group. What Justice
O'Connor fails to see, or perhaps more correctly, refuses to
see, is that the classification "black" for instance, also defines
a culture; a shared heritage of language patterns, habits, his-
tory, and experience. 97 While black culture is understandably
diverse, a major part of its history and experience "is that of
battling cultural suppression if not obliteration, as well as dis-
crimination and exclusion from the larger society." 98 This
history and experience cuts across economic divisions albeit
with sometimes overlapping and sometimes differing manifes-
tations.99 It is, therefore, a licensee's Afro-American (or Eu-
ment over the weight to be accorded the evidence of a nexus in the Metro Broadcasting
case.
Diversity of viewpoint, however, is important not only to minorities whose view-
points are under-represented and whose needs are under-served, but also to the non-
minority audience-indeed to the entire American society as well. There was no disa-
greement on the Court regarding this basic premise. Any requirement to demonstrate a
nexus between the minority ownership of the proposed licensee and its proposed pro-
gramming must not rest solely on the demonstrable lack of diversity which may attend
markets in which significant minority citizens remain under-represented and under-
served. This is so despite the argument that a better case is made for finding a nexus
under such circumstances. See Spitzer, Justifying Minority Preferences in Broadcasting,
64 S. CAL. L. REV. 293 (1991). This same lack of diversity of viewpoint may be even
more pronounced in a market having a negligible minority population. See West Michi-
gan Broadcasting Co. V. FCC, 735 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1027 (1985).
97. Williams, supra note 60, at 529.
98. Id.
99. See Nightline: Black in White America (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 29,
1989) (transcript of Show No. 2157).
Ted Koppel, ABC News: Charles.... one of the black men you talked to
in the project used ... [t]he... word genocide. Explain for a moment why
there are some in the black community who regard what has happened and
continues to happen to blacks in this country as the moral equivalent of geno-
cide. It doesn't fit the strict definition of the word, certainly.
Charles Thomas, ABC News: Well, it doesn't just happen to blacks who
live in housing projects. It happens to me when I get in my car and drive to
the grocery store. I realize that if I'm stopped by a white police officer-who
happens to be a racist who's having a bad day-I might not see the sun set
that night. But in their case, they're dying every day. When they wake up in
the morning, they might not see the sun set that day and they realize that. But
its something we live with every day.... You're taught this very young when
you're black in America.... [M]any white editorial staffs might dismiss the
comment as paranoia or looniness, but its real."
Id. at 5.
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ropean-American) cultural heritage that is, likely to be
manifest in their choice of editorials, news, and other pro-
gramming. This is, in essence, what the majority concluded
Congress and the FCC had found.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A. An Affirmation of the Importance of Cultural and
Electronic Diversity
Whether viewed as the last gift of the enlightened juris-
prudence of Justices Brennan and Marshall, the political acu-
men of Justice Brennan, the reassertion of the collectivist
philosophies of the Court's liberal justices, or the harbinger of
the long feared or heralded shift to the right engineered by the
emerging conservative Court majority, Metro Broadcasting is
the Court's most recent statement on diversity and on equal
protection. As such, Metro Broadcasting is a case of critical
importance.
It reaffirms the government's role in affirmatively en-
hancing the public's first amendment right to diversity of
viewpoints. It also reasserts as. law, the proposition that the
federal government, under appropriately limited circum-
stances, may use race conscious policies to address current
structural societal inequalities resulting from historical socie-
tal discrimination. These critical legal pronouncements are
made in affirming the federal government's efforts to enhance
the diversity of viewpoints made available to the American
public by the inclusion of previously under-represented groups
in the ownership of electronic media.
These legal affirmations come at a critical juncture in
American political, economic and social life. The 1990s are a
time in which the economic fortitude and moral substance of a
significant portion of America's historically disenfranchised
minority citizens is being debated in the mass media. The de-
bate is increasingly characterized by a hardening of liberal
(congressional) and conservative (Bush administration) posi-
tions. Liberals propose "a more sober version of the best of
the New Deal and the Great Society" as the appropriate re-
sponse to the lingering malignant malaise of poverty, drugs
1089
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and crime that infests our inner cities.10° Conservatives insist
that "a cultural revival of the protestant [work] ethic in [com-
munities of disenfranchised black] America" 10 1 is the one true
cure. These terms and the adversarial postures taken too
often fail to inform this debate. 10 2  Moreover, what is too
often lacking is the presentation of views representative of the
culturally and economically diverse black community which
is the subject of the debate.10 3 For the present at least, the
Court in the Metro Broadcasting case has stated that the gov-
ernment may seek to assure a more representative debate by
making available to the members of the black community
greater opportunities to participate in setting the parameters
of the debate as well as participating in the debate as owners
of electronic media. 1 4
100. West, Nihilism in Black America: the Danger that Corrodes from Within, Dis-
SENT, April 1, 1991, at 221.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 221-22. West asserts:
[T]he 'liberal structuralists' . . . and the 'conservative behavioralists'... have
nearly suffocated the crucial debate that should be taking place about the pros-
pects for black America.... The liberal/conservative discussion conceals the
most basic issue now facing black America: the nihilistic threat to its very
existence. This threat is not simply a matter of relative economic deprivation
and political powerlessness-though economic well-being and political clout are
requisites for meaningful black progress. It is primarily a question of speaking
to the profound sense of psychological depression, personal worthlessness, and
social despair so widespread in [disenfranchised] black America.
Id.
103. See Nightline: Black in White America, supra note 98.
Ted Koppel, ABC News: So Ray, . . . [i]t had to be ... an enormously
complex paradox. Each of you is a professional: you could have done a purely
objective job, but if you'd done that, then why bother doing a program [on
blacks in the United States] staffed principally by blacks? On the other hand,
if you go too far in the other direction, you're going to alienate everyone who's
watching. Give us a little.., insight into.., what you wanted to achieve.
Ray Nunn, ABC News: Well, Ted, ... [i]t was not so much in terms of
tone, it was in terms of focus.... We show people for the first time not just
one aspect of black America, but a variety of black Americans, from various
walks of life. We don't cover all black Americans, but we certainly give you a
notion ... that black Americans cover a wide range of endeavors and success
and poverty and wealth .... [T]hat was key to us.
Id. at 4.
104. It has been suggested that the minority ownership programs "do not benefit
the broad mass of minority group members who suffer from disproportionately high
rates of poverty and unemployment and all the social ills that accompany those condi-
tions ...." Fried, supra note 57, at 120. Heightened economic or political status has
not removed the unwarranted stigma associated with being black. See supra notes 85,
91, 98 and accompanying text. Moreover, blacks as a group do share a common cul-
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Concomitantly, the value and importance to be accorded
the cultures and values of America's growing minority popu-
lation of citizens is likewise the subject of intense debate.
Here again, what is too often lacking is an informed articula-
tion of the broad range and variety of positions and view-
points resident in the various minority populations and
communities. As the number of these communities increases,
so too will differences in perspectives on history and culture
between groups composed of American citizens of predomi-
nantly European, African, "Hispanic," Native American and/
or Asian ancestry will increase. 0 5 No doubt, many of the dif-
ferences will be explored in the electronic mass media.
Through the Metro Broadcasting holding, the Court seeks to
assist the FCC in assuring that the debates over differences
(and hopefully similarities) will include representatives of all
those whose differences (and similarities) will be debated.
B. The Future of Diversity Jurisprudence
Both the majority and dissent viewed the diversity inter-
est in broadcasting as resting on the fact that access to broad-
casting is constrained by spectrum scarcity. 1o6 For both then,
tural heritage. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. As the Congress and the
Court noted, the perspectives and sensitivities which attend the common experience of
racism and the cultural heritage of "blackness," are more likely to be manifested in the
minority entrepreneur's programming choices, and will benefit the disenfranchised as
well.
Having questioned the likelihood that the economically disenfranchised would ben-
efit from the policies, however, Fried then castigates the financial arrangement em-
ployed by the litigant Astroline, which allowed the minority entrepreneur with
substantial broadcast expertise but limited finances to become a part owner! The prac-
tice of trading on "sweat equity" is not new, nor is it limited to minorities. To catego-
rize it as a "naked financial advantage accorded on the basis of race," is at best, highly
misleading. See Fried, supra note 57, at 120-21.
105. See Henry, supra note 22.
The deeper significance of America's becoming a majority nonwhite society is
what it means to the national psyche, to individual's' sense of themselves and
their nation-their idea of what it is to be American .... Rather than ac-
cepting U.S. history and its meaning as settled, citizens will feel ever more free
to debate where the nation's successes sprang from and what its unalterable
beliefs are. They will clash over which myths and icons to invoke in educa-
tion, in popular culture, in ceremonial speechmaking from political campaigns
to the State of the Union Address.
Id. at 28.
106. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3010; id. at 3036 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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scarcity is the linchpin for affirmative efforts to enhance
broadcast diversity through regulation of broadcast ownership
and speech. While technical scarcity yet remains as the statu-
tory basis for much of broadcast regulation, scarcity has not
enjoyed the same judicial support as a justification for regula-
tion of cable and other new technologies. There is a lack of
uniformity in lower court rulings regarding the ability of the
government to justify regulation of other technologies such as
cable, by resort to the scarcity rationale. 0 7 As a consequence,
the scarcity rationale may have questionable utility as justifi-
cation for affirmative protection of the public's right to diver-
sity and access outside the broadcast industry.
Because the dissent characterizes diversity as unimpor-
tant due to the allegedly imprecise manner in which the gov-
ernment measures diverse viewpoints, future government
efforts to extend or expand regulation on the basis of the inter-
est may be subject to heightened scrutiny by the "new major-
ity" of the Court. It will be hard to justify extending or
expanding the scope of regulation over speech activity the
government allegedly cannot adequately define or measure.
And, to the extent the Court's new majority continues to per-
ceive the government as advancing the diversity interest based
on assumption rather than empirical findings that ownership
is related to content, there is little likelihood the Court will
look favorably upon any expansion of the diversity interest be-
yond its limited applicability in the broadcast arena.
The likelihood decreases further if the Court becomes en-
amored of the marketplace theory of regulation. The dissent's
view of the marketplace as a real, albeit ill-defined con-
straining influence on editorial discretion may ultimately
107. See, e.g., Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F. 2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(holding that economic scarcity is an improper justification for government regulation
of cable); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F. 2d 1396 (9th
Cir. 1985) (same). But see Omega Satellite Products v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d
119 (7th Cir. 1982); Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp.
976 (D.C.R.I. 1983); Hopkinsville Cable TV, Inc. v. Pennroyal Cablevision, Inc., 562 F.
Supp. 543, (W.D. Ky. 1982) (all holding that economic scarcity is an appropriate justifi-
cation for government regulation).
See generally, Meyerson, The First Amendment and the Cable Television Operator:
An Unprotective Shield Against Public Access Requirements, 4 COMM./ENT. 1 (1981);
Worth & Cobb-Reiley, A First Amendment Critique of the 1984 Cable Act, 31 J. BROAD-
CASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 391 (Fall 1987).
1092
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prove incompatible with the government's intuitively logical
expectation that ownership carries with it the right to exert
control over the content of electronic speech. This conclusion
may prove particularly apt given the dissent's disinclination to
accord any weight to the empirical evidence supporting the
nexus between ownership and diversity.108
108. Although asserted with regard to Croson, Dixon's observation is appropriate
here:
What is most disturbing about th[e] [dissent's] position is that it [would have
the] effect of completely altering the nature of 'acceptable' evidence in [diver-
sity jurisprudence]. The dissent dismisses outright evidence which heretofore
had been deemed probative in establishing the present day effects [justifying
the government's efforts to enhance diversity] ....
Dixon, supra note 65, at 43.
The Metro Court's debate regarding the value to be accorded the evidence of a
nexus between minority ownership and diversity of viewpoint requires further scrutiny.
The debate highlights the conflict between the dissent's market-oriented economic ap-
proach and the majority's socially-oriented approach to the definition of broadcast di-
versity. In questioning the ability of minority broadcasters to program differently, the
dissent focuses on the policy goal of economic efficiency to "achieve a maximum match
between individual preferences and communication industry production." See Entman
& Wildman, Toward A New Analytical Framework For Media Policy: Reconciling
Economic and Non-Economic Perspectives On The Marketplace of Ideas 28 (Confer-
ence paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Telecommunications Policy Re-
search Conference, Airlie Virginia, October 1-2, 1991). However, an emphasis on
economic efficiency to the exclusion of other policy goals may be ill-advised.
An economic efficiency analysis is morally questionable if the communication in-
dustry production is geared to the satisfaction of a demand for programming featuring
racist stereotypes. Brennan, The Fairness Doctrine As Public Policy, 33 J. BROADCAST-
ING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 419 (Fall 1989). Moreover, "satisfying viewer preferences
cannot serve as a basis for evaluation when the actions affect fundamental belief sys-
tems." Id.
An excellent though little addressed case in point is the current nomenclature of
race. "Blacks" or Afro-Americans, "whites" or Euro-Americans, as well as Asian
Americans and Hispanic Americans are too often treated by the media as (and assumed
by the public and government institautions to be) monolithic groups composed of inter-
nally homogeneous stock. Historically in the United States, multi-racial people have
been considered to be the race of their non-white parent. This practice dates back to the
European settlers who married Native Americans and the European slave owners who
impregnated African women. Moreover, the American population is continually blend-
ing. Currently, at least two percent of all marriages in the United States are "interra-
cial." See Atkins, When Life Isn't Simply Black or White, N.Y. Times June 5, 1991, at
Cl, col. 1; Norwood & Klein, Developing Statistics to Meet Society's Needs, 112
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 14, (Oct. 1989); Schlangenstein, State's 1-32nd "Negro" Blood
Law Revisited, UPI, May 14, 1983; Gloster, Witness Says AllAmerican Whites 5 Percent
Black, UPI, Sept. 14, 1982.
As the historical and current melding of America ought to make clear, humanity's
"present biological nature developed, and is still developing, in the course of continuous
cross-breeding processes. In this context, therefore, the concept of purity is no more
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C. Un-Equal Protection?
Finally, several Court watchers have suggested that the
Court, with the departure of Brennan, contains at least four
solid votes against the government's use of policies based on
racial classifications in order to address the current inequities
brought about by historical societal discrimination." 9 If Jus-
tice Souter sides with the conservative justices, 110 the con-
servative members could muster five votes in favor of the
narrow reading of equal protection jurisprudence set forth in
Croson.
Commentators on the Court (and at least one justice)
have asserted that the new majority of the Court manifests a
proclivity for conservative activism as opposed to judicial re-
than metaphor, wishful thinking, fantasy." Memmi, Racism Today: 'Us' and 'Them,'
UNESCO COURIER, Nov. 1983, at 11. Finally, while humans do differ from each other
culturally and biologically, "most scientific research reveals... that the differences are
so fragmented that it is impossible to make a given social group coincide with any one
biological profile." Id See also Stringer, The Emergence of Modern Humans, 263 Sci.
AM. 98, (Dec. 1990). Nevertheless, the majority of American citizens, regardless of
heritage, as well as the media and government that serve them, paint our society as one
of Blacks, Whites, Asians, Hispanics and Native Americans. This creates significant
difficulties for many people. See generally Scales-Trent, Commonalities on Being Black
and White, Different and the Same, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 305 (1990).
As the above example may illustrate, consumers may seek to avoid diversity in
order to "avoid challenging and disturbing ideas that violate conventional wisdom or
raise complexities." Entman & Wildman, supra, at 35-36. In the absence of a diverse
ideas marketplace, the public will be at best uninformed and hence unmotivated to de-
mand such a marketplace. Under such circumstances, reliance on consumer demand
perpetuates the status quo. Id. at 36.
109. See Sedler, supra note 13, at 1218 ("The sharp division of the Court in Metro
Broadcasting may be an indication that positions on the Court have hardened, and that
the Court's seeming institutibnal ambivalence toward the permissibility of racial prefer-
ence is now the result of a fundamental disagreeriient within the Court over the basic
value question of the constitutional permissibility of any racial preference."). Sedler
goes on to note that "at the the present time it appears that Justices, Rehnquist, Scalia,
Kennedy and'possibly Justice O'Connor, have made the value judgement against the
constitutional permissibility of racial preference." Id. at 1231.
110. See Greenhouse, Conservatively Speaking, It's An Activist Supreme Court, N.Y.
Times, May 26, 1991, § 4, at El, col. 4.
At his confirmation hearing last fall, David Souter... indicated that while he
might not have chosen many of the Warren Court's expansive departures, he
now regarded that legacy not as an aberration but as part of the law's modern
fabric. But if he is troubled by the developments this term, he has not indi-
cated so either by his vote or his voice. If his silent assent indicates that he is
comfortable with the Rehnquist camp, it is hard to see what obstacles remain
in the way of the Court's activist course.
Id. at E3, col. 5.
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straint. 11' Thus it is possible that this new majority might,
despite stare decisis, revisit the Metro Broadcasting decision in
a challenge to the tax certificate policy which was not before
the Court in Metro Broadcasting.1 1 2 In such a challenge, they
might apply their narrow interpretation of the equal protec-
111. Professor David Chang has argued that the new majority of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia and Stevens, professes judicial con-
servatism while in actuality pursuing activist agendas which seriously intrude upon the
valid democratic discretion of the electorate. See, Chang, supra note 48, at 810-21.
Ironically, Justice O'Connor apparently concurs (at least in part) when she articu-
lates the problem clearly in her dissent in a recent family planning decision:
"It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint... that this Court will not reach
constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them."
... It is enough in this case to conclude that neither the language nor the
history of § 1008 compels the Secretary's interpretation and that the interpre-
tation raises serious First Amendment concerns. On this basis alone, I would
reverse the judgement of the Court of Appeals and invalidate the challenged
regulations.
Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 1788-89 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting
Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. World Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138
(1984)) (addressing the majority's decision to declare constitutional rules prohibiting
employees of federally funded clinics from discussing abortion with the clinics' pa-
tients). See also, Excerpts from Court Ruling Curbing Family Planning Clinics, N.Y.
Times, May 24, 1991, at A19, col. 6.
The Court's new majority is already perceived as failing to adhere to the precepts
of judicial conservatism many of it's members espoused not so long ago. "There is a
distinct sense at the Court now of competing long-held agendas. The Chief Judge and
his allies appear to believe that for much of their adult lifetimes, the Court went seri-
ously astray in ways that can finally be rectified, by conventionally conservative means
if possible, by activists methods if necessary." Greenhouse, supra note 109, at E3, col.
4, and at E3, col. 5. See also 5 Justices Uphold U.S. Curbing Abortion Advice, N.Y.
Times, May 24, 1991, at AI, col. 5.
112. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3005, n.7. Indeed, at least one commentator
believes that the recently confirmed Judge Thomas would vote against the minority
preference policy, and would not defer to Congress. See Taylor, Beware the Judicial
Override, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1991, at A25, col. 1.
According to sources within the Court. of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Judge
Thomas, while still a member of that court, recently authored a draft opinion in Lam-
precht v. FCC, a 2-1 decision which will overturn an FCC award of a broadcast license
to an applicant under the FCC's female ownership policy. Berke, Two Democrats On
Senate Panel Say They Will Oppose Thomas, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1991, Al, col. 1.
According to the Washington Legal Times, Thomas may have made a distinction be-
tween the FCC's female ownership policy and its minority policy. In the oral argument
of the case before the court of appeals, counsel for the FCC argued that Metro Broad-
casting was controlling in the Lamprecht case. Thomas is said to have responded: "At
least in the case of minorities, there was documented evidence that there was a differ-
ence in programming." See Sturges, Delayed Release Sparks Concern: Thomas Drafted
Ruling in Controversial Case, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 30, 1991. Apparently, "Thomas, in
both oral argument and his draft opinion .... focussed on the need for more proof from
the FCC-and Congress-that the gender preferences enhanced programming diver-
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tion doctrine to the tax certificate policy and effectively over-
rule Metro Broadcasting. 3  Should the "new activist"
majority succeed in overturning Metro Broadcasting, the suc-
cessful resolution of critical debates over the future of our
multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society may be placed in even
greater jeopardy.' 4
sity." Because of the perceived lack of evidence, Thomas was apparently disinclined to
defer to Congress' findings regarding the importane of female ownership. Id.
If the Lamprecht opinion is published as it is reported to have been written, it may
be premature to assert with any certitude how Justice Thomas may ultimately rule on
an award to a minority-owned applicant under the FCC distress sale policy. However,
if he maintains his current distinction between Lamprecht and Metro, and a challenge to
the tax certificate policy is heard by the Court, he might vote, albeit reluctantly, to
uphold the minority ownership policies.
113. See supra note 10.
114. Sedler suggests that the conservative majority's hostility to racial preferences
does not belie a hostility to the use of "race neutral" means to achieve racial objectives
of equality. Pursuit of this tack may have inherent problems, however. Sedler, supra
note 13, at 1232-33.
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